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PROPOSED LEGISLATION PENDING IN THE CONGRESS AND IN THE MINNESOTA LEGISLATURE
CONCERNING THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS
By

HARVEY HosHOUR*

In his brilliantly done book: "The Administrative Process"',
Dean Landis writes:
"The most fascinating branch of American constitutional law
relates to judicial review over legislative action. Here one is presented with decisions that speak of contest between two agencies
of government-one, like St. George, eternally refreshing its vigor
from the stream of democratic desires, the other majestically girding itself with the wisdom of the ages. Similarly, jn the field of
administrative law judicial review over administrative action gives
a sense of battle" (p. 123).
One gets this "sense of battle" from other sources too., Sometimes the thrust is largely against those who, for one reason or
another, have supported and continue to support legislation along
the lines of that now pending. Thus in December, 1940, President
Roosevelt, in vetoing2 the Logan-IValter Bill, then sponsored
by the American Bar Association, said:
"Court procedure is adapted to the intensive investigation of
individual controversies. But it is impossible to subject the daily
routine of fact-finding in many of our agencies to court procedure.
Litigation has become costly beyond the ability of the average
person to bear. Its technical rules of procedure are often traps
*Of the Ramsey County, Minnesota, Bar: formerly Professor of Law,
University of Minnesota.
'Published in 1938 by Yale University Press. The four chapters of Dean
Landis' book constituted the Storrs Lectures on Jurisprudence at the Yale
School of Law delivered in January, 1938.
"The full text of the President's veto message is printed in (1941) 27
A. B. A. J. 52, 53.
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for the unwary and technical rules of evidence often prevent common sense determinations on information which would be regarded
as adequate for any business decision. The increasing cost of competent legal advice and the necessity of relying upon lawyers to
conduct proceedings have made all laymen and most lawyers
recognize the inappropriateness of entrusting routine processes
of government to the outcome of never-ending lawsuits." * * *
The very heart of modern reform administration is the administrafive tribunal. * * * Great interests, therefore, which desire to
escape regulation rightly see that if they can strike at the heart
of modern reform by sterilizing the administrative tribunal which
administers them, they will have effectively destroyed the reform
itself.
"The bill that is now before me is one of the repeated efforts
by a combination of lawyers who desire to have all processes of
government conducted through lawsuits and of interests which
desire to escape regulations. The effort was made in the recent
New York constitutional convention by this same combination
of influences to deprive-state tribunals of their authority. That
effort was wisely rejected by the people at the polls. The effort
was continued on a national scale to destroy the administrative
tribunals which enforce the nation's important laws. It is from
this background that this bill has emerged."
Just about a month after the President's message Dean Pound
replied, in a speech before the Judicial Section of the New York
Bar Association, in language no less positive :3
"A recent veto message has read a lecture to the organized
lawyers of America and told the judges to confine the judicial
process to cases 'appropriate for its exercise.' This message is so
thoroughly in keeping with the Marxian idea of the disappearance
of law, now much in fashion, and so much in the spirit of the
absolute ideas which have been making headway all over the
world in the past two decades, that it deserves to be made the
text for a discussion of the place of the judiciary in our democracy.
It is not my purpose to discuss the particular measure which called
forth this message. Such a measure is difficult to draw, and in
spite of all the care devoted to it by able lawyers it is not unlikely
that it was open to specific objections. But the message attacks
the whole purpose of the measure and of any measure which may
be designed to make effective and available to the ordinary citizen
the constitutional guarantees against arbitrary and high-handed
official or governmental action. What I wish to consider, therefore,
is its attitude toward the law, toward constitutional limitations and
guarantees, and toward the judiciary-in short, toward the characteristic American legal-political polity which had been developed
in this country under our constitutions.
3(1941) 27 A. B. A. J. 133.
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"In this consideration of the attitude of the message toward
law and the judiciary it is not necessary to consider the conventional jibes at the profession as being in a conspiracy with sinister
interests, preferring shrewd play upon technical rules to the substance of controversies, and juggling cases rather than getting
down to the merits. What has been done to eliminate such things
from the judicial administration of justice has been chiefly the
work of the very association against which these time worn charges
are made, and I need say no more about them.
"Whether well or ill carried out, and at any rate carried out
with no assistance from and indeed in spite of opposition from
administrative agencies and advocates of allowing them absolute
powers, the purpose of the measure was to make available to people generally by means of a simple, expeditious, relatively inexpensive procedure, what is guaranteed to them by the constitution."
In certain of the opinions of the Supreme Court one also gets
this same "sense of battle" on the vital issue here involved. The
case of Joncs v. Securities & Exchange Commission4 was decided on April 6, 1936. There the Court's opinion was delivered
by Mr. justice Sutherland and contains the following:
"The action of the commission finds no support in right principle or in law. It is wholly unreasonable and arbitrary. It violates the cardinal precept upon which the constitutional safeguards
of personal liberty ultimately rest-that this shall be a government
of law,-because to the precise extent that the mere will of an
official or an official body is permitted to take the place of allowable official discretion or to supplantthe standing law as a rule
of human conduct, the government ceases to be one of laws and
becomes an autocracy. Against the threat of such a contingency
the courts have always been vigilant, and, if they are to perform
their constitutional duties in the future, must never cease to be
vigilant, to detect and turn aside the danger at its beginning" (pp.
23, 24).
"Arbitrary power and the rule of the Constitution cannot both
exist. They are antagonistic and incompatible forces; and one
or the other must of necessity perish whenever they are brought
into conflict. To borrow the words of Mr. Justice Day--'there is
no place in our constitutional system for the exercise of arbitrary
power.' Garfield v. Goldsby, 211 U. S. 249, 262. To escape assumptions of such power on the part of the three primary departments
of the government, is not enough. Our institutions must be kept
free from the appropriation of unauthorized power by lesser
agencies as well. And if the various administrative bureaus and
commissions, necessarily called and being called into existence by
the increasing complexities of our modern business and political
affairs, are permitted gradually to extend their powers by en01936) 298 U. S. 1, 56 S. Ct. 654, 80 L. Ed. 1015.
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croachments-even petty encroachments-upon the fundamental
rights, privileges and immunities of the people, we shall in the
end, while avoiding the fatal consequences of a supreme autocracy,
become submerged by a multitude of minor invasions of personal
rights, less destructive but no less violative of constitutional guaranties" (pp. 24, 25).
The opinion in the Jones Case also suggests that the Commission's actions were like "those intolerable abuses of the Star
Chamber, which brought that institution to an end at the hands of
the Long Parliament in 1640," a comparison which led Mr. justice
Cardozo, dissenting for himself, Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr.
Justice Stone, to say: "Historians may find hyperbole in the sanguinary simile" (p. 33).
If the question were not of such vital and continuing importance in the relation of government to business, as well as of the
courts to the administrative commissions, one might dismiss these
differences in the words of Gilbert and Sullivan:
"How Nature always does contrive
That every boy and every gal,
That's born into this world alive,
Is either a little Liberal,
Or a little Conservative."'
But the question is of vital importance and that importance
continues, for liberals and conservatives alike. The American Bar
Association, notwithstanding the rebuff from the President implicit in his veto message above quoted, has continued its work in
this field, with the results to be commented on herein, and the
Minnesota Bar Association has likewise entered the field and is
sponsoring a bill now pending in the State Legislature which was
approved by the Association at its Duluth meeting last July, also to
be commented on herein. It is not the purpose of this article to
analyze or discuss the relevant decided cases in detail. That has
been done many times in the Law Reviews and elsewhere, most
recently in the November, 1944, number of the Harvard Law
Review. 6 Rather it is to set out and briefly to discuss those provisions of the bills now pending in Washington and in St. Paul
which have to do with judicial review of administrative decisions,
in the thought that thereby lawyers and others who may be in5

1olanthe, II.
OStern, Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges and Juries: A
Comparative Analysis, (1944) 58 Harv. L. Rev. 70. See also Dickinson,
Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law, (1927) and Brown: Administrative Commissions and the Judicial Power, (1935) 19 MINNEsOrA
LAw REvIEw 261.
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terested will have current data readily available on the crucially
important question involved.
Before discussing these bills in detail, I want to refer at some
length to what is the best,-and at once the most interesting,statement of the background material on this subject, among the
many similar statements I have read. It comes from an address:
"Administrative Discretion," delivered on October 12, 1932, at
the meeting of the Association of Practitioners before the Interstate Commerce Commission, by Henry Wolf Bikl6, long a distinguished scholar in the constitutional law field as well as a skilled
practitioner of administrative law:7
"In his famous opinion in M1arbury v. Madison, Chief Justice
Marshall said:
'The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws and not of
men.'
"Inthus reiterating the famous antithesis of James Harrington
carried into the Constitution of Massachusetts of 1780, the great
Chief justice gave currency to a terse description of a conception which has come to be regarded as fundamental if free institutions are to be preserved. It summarizes in a simple contrast
the revolt against autocratic power. It is an accepted axiom of our
governmental system.
"But candor compels the concession that it is impossible for
the law to be so clearly and so completely stated as to eliminate
all doubtful cases. Particularly is this true because, as Dean
Pound says:
'Law must be stable and yet it cannot stand still.'
Now, as soon as the presence of the doubtful case is admitted, it
becomes necessary to recognize the possibility that the judicial
answer to hardly-contested litigation may depend on considerations
which, while not excluding, will be in addition to, those of pure
logic. In the conflict of principles which underlies some litigationin the difficulty of determining the application of admitted standards because of their vagueness or indefiniteness, which underlies
so much more-the courts themselves are frequently in doubt. But
they must decide one way or the other; and in such case of doubt
their decisions may be affected consciously or unconsciously by
what Mr. Justice Holmes, with his accustomed felicity, describes as
.a judgment or intuition more subtle than any articulate major premise.'
Decisions in such cases-in spite of lip-service to the fidelity of
the courts to the law-represent a choice between two different
7

Mr. BikM1's address is printed in (1933)
Review 1.

2 George Washington Law
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but possible answers. That there is this real possibility of choice
becomes at once-and painfully-apparent if counsel ask themselves how much confidence they have as to the probable fate of
cases which they have argued, but which remain undecided.
"In other words, to quote Mr. Justice Holmes again, judges
do legislate, but
'they are confined from molar to molecular motions.'
a fact which Mr. Justice Cardozo has interestingly elaborated in
his lectures on the Nature of the Judicial Process.
"But to the extent that judges possess this freedom of choice
in deciding cases, it is difficult to justify the statement that they
are controlled in their decision by established law. The orthodox
theory is that they are supposed to discover the law and not to
make it, but this theory cannot, in all cases, be made to square
with actuality. In the doubtful cases, and within the limits of the
doubt, men govern rather than the law.
"It is inevitable that this should be so, since it is impossible
to foresee, and, by specific rules of law, to provide for, all the
possible situations that may come to require the application of
some rule of law. General principles or standards must be established which are bound to carry with them a penumbra of vagueness or uncertainty, and to involve doubt in their application to
specific, concrete situations.
"Now, this difficulty becomes increasingly troublesome with
the growing complexity of modern life. It proves more and more
difficult to lay down rules to govern the activities of everyday
life, which will be at once simple and definite. In addition, the
customary procedure of the courts frequently proves ill-adapted
to the enforcement of the vague standards which it is deemed
wise to ordain.
"As one result, regulatory commissions are created, which
are intended, on the one hand, to furnish more adequate machinery
for the enforcement of new rules, and, on the other, to provide
tribunals for the purpose of making definite in concrete cases the
indefinite standards which the legislature finds it necessary to establish. In this authority on the part of regulatory commissions to
make definite in concrete cases the indefinite standards established by the legislature lies a range of discretion far wider than
that customarily possible of exercise by the courts, and involving
to a much greater extent a government of men rather than a
government of laws."
One might have expected, in view of the background of the
regulatory commissions, as pointed out by Mr. Bikl6, that there
might have been a more general effort to assimilate these commissions into the judicial system than there seems to have been in
the past, particularly among lawyers and others trained in and

REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS

familiar with the traditions, purposes and development of the
law. Thus in 1936 the present Chief Justice of the United States
said :8

"Rarely in the history of the law has such an opportunity
come to our profession to carry forward a creative work which
would enable the law to satisfy the pressing needs of a changing
order without the loss of essential values. The ultimate establishment of equity, after a period of resistance, as a coordinate branch
of the law, ameliorating the rigors of the common-law system and
translating in some measure moral into juristic obligations, is a
comparable transition in the law. The profession of our day, like
its predecessors who saw in the pretensions of the chancellor but
a new danger to the common law, has given little evidence that
it sees in this new method of administrative control any opportunity except for resistance to a strange and therefore unwelcome innovation."
Some lawyers have realistically explained the tendency referred to in the last sentence quoted from Mr. Justice Stone's address in terms not altogther complimentary to the profession.
Thus John Foster Dulles, eminent New York lawyer and Chairman of the Committee on Administrative Law of the Bar Association of the City of New York, in an address at the Harvard Law
SchoolP said:
"Lawyers have heretofore had to deal, primarily, with the
static. Laws have been passed which constituted, for the time being, a complete and final exercise of the legislative power. Such
laws constituted obstacles to action in certain particular ways, but
they were fixed obstacles. Today we encounter, not a mere obstacle, but a weapon which is like a flaming sword. It is not
static but is wielded by skilled hands, directed by astute brains.
The flexibility and scope is such that avoidance thereof is impossible and adjustment thereto a difficult problem. Vast fields which
touch the lives of us all have been turned over to the ministration
,r policing of such agencies. * * *

"The Bar historically has been conservative, standing against
changes which materially modified the rules within which they
worked. From time to time important changes have occurred.
But they have usually occurred due to pressure from without
rather than to reform from within. The introduction of 'equity'
came when common law had become so rigid that legal technique
was almost an end in itself, largely unrelated to justice. Simplificatio n of pleadings, liberalization of rules of evidence have come
primarily from pressure from the outside public which, in the
'The Common Law in the United States, (1936) 50 Harvard Law Rev.
4,17.
"Printed in (1939) 25 A. B. A. J. 275.
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face of recurrent failures of justice, demanded less technical procedures.
"Administrative bodies represent the most recant and most
flagrant intrusion into the lawyer's preserve. Thereby there has
occurred an extraordinary change in the rules of the game. The
classic separation of legislative, executive and judicial functions
has been cast aside. The law has, in effect, become mobile rather
than static. Uncertainty replaces certainty, and much which has
been learned over the years has become obsolete. No longer is it
possible for a lawyer to sit at his desk and by making logical
deductions from past decisions advise his client with confidence
as to his rights. All of this is naturally disturbing and upsetting to
lawyers and tends to create in them a sullen resentfulness which,
unless overcome, will largely disqualify them from effectively representing their clients."
However this may be or may have been, it is believed that the
pending bills show that in large degree American lawyers are coming to recognize the "opportunity" to which Mr. Justice Stone
refers, and that they are truly coming to see in the "new method of
administrative control" far more than the chance "for resistance
to a strange and therefore unwelcome innovation." There is encouragement here also in the language of certain recent decisions
of the Supreme Court. Thus in the third Morgan Case"° the Court
said that
"in construing a statute setting up an administrative agency
and providing for judicial review of its action, court and agency
are not to be regarded as wholly independent and unrelated instrumentalities of justice, each acting in the performance of its
prescribed statutory duty without regard to the appropriate function of the other in securing the plainly indicated objects of the
statute. Court and agency are the means adopted to attain the
prescribed end, and so far as their duties are defined by the words
of the statute, those words should be construed so as to attain
that end through coordinated action. Neither body should repeat
in this day the mistake made by the courts of law when equity was
struggling for recognition as an ameliorating system of justice:
neither can rightly be regarded by the other as an alien intruder,
to be tolerated if must be, but never to be encouraged or aided by
the other in the attainment of the common aim." (P. 191.)
Again in the fourth Morgan Case" the Court reiterated the
same thought:
"It will bear repeating that although the administrative process
has had a different development and pursues somewhat different
'oUnited States v. Morgan, (1939) 307 U. S. 183, 59 S.Ct. 795, 83 L.
Ed. 1211.
"United States v. Morgan, (1941) 313 U. S.409, 61 S. Ct. 999, 85 L.
Ed. 1429.

REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS

ways from those of courts, they are to be deemed collaborative
instrumentalities of justice and the appropriate independence of
each should be respected by the other." (P. 422.)
The difference of opinion between the Justices in Buford v. Sun
Oil Co..

"
'

which led Mr. Justice Frankfurter in dissenting to com-

ment that:
"To talk about courts as 'working partners' with administrative agencies whenever there is judicial review of administrative
action is merely another way of saying that legislative policies ,are
enforced partly through administrative agencies and partly through
courts." (P. 347.)
does not indicate a retreat from the language quoted from the
decisions in the two Morgan Cases, but only a difference as to its
applicability to the facts in the decided case. Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurred in the opinion quoted from in the third Morgan
Case and wrote that in the fourth M[organ Case. Further, his
contribution toward a middle-ground solution of the "battle"
between the courts and the commissions, wholly aside from his
work as a Justice of the Supreme Court, have been many and
verv great.la In so far as this article has a thesis other than to
set forth the information about the pending bills above referred to,
that thesis is that the development in the past few years among
lawyers and judges alike has been away from the "battle" concept suggested by Dean Landis and others, and toward a realization of the fact,--as fact I believe it to be,-that the courts and
the administrative agencies are indeed "collaborative instrumentalities of justice" (whether or not one classifies them as "working
partners," as did Mr. justice Black in the Buford decision above
referred to) and that there can be worked out a fair and reasonably satisfactory basis for their respective jurisdictions. This
necessarily leads to a discussion of the pending bills.
Bills Pending before the Congress of the United States
On January 6. 1945. Senator McCarran, Chairman of the
Senate Judiciary Committee, introduced S. 7 :4 "A bill tW improve
I ( 1943) 319 U. S. 315, 63 S. Ct. 1098, 87 L. Ed. 1424.
''Sce Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law, (1927) 75 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 614, and also his brilliant summation of the Cincinnati Conference on Functions and Procedure of Administrative Tribunals on March 5, 1938, as reported in 24 A. B. A. J. 282.
"An identical bill, H.R. 1203, was introduced in the House of Representatives on January 8, 1945, by 'Mr. Sumners, Chairman of the House
Judiciary Committee. These bills were referred to the respective Committees
on Judiciary of both houses.
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the administration of justice by prescribing fair administrative
procedure." The part of this bill here relevant is Sec. 10 (e) and
reads as follows:
"(e) Scope of Review. So far as necessary to decision and
where presented the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and
determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of any agency
action. It shall (A) direct or compel agency action unlawfully
withheld or unreasonably delayed and (B) hold unlawful and set
aside agency action found (1) arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise
not in accordance with law, (2) contrary to constitutional right,
power, privilege, or immunity, (3) in excess of statutory right.
(4) without due observance of procedure required by law, (5) unsupported by competent, material, and substantial evidence upon the
whole agency record as reviewed by the court in any case subject to
the requirements of sections 7 and 8, or (6) unwarranted by the
facts to the extent that the facts in any case are subject to trial
de novo by the reviewing court. The relevant facts shall be tried
and determined de novo by the original court of review in all
cases in which adjudications are not required by statute to be
made upon agency hearing."
Before giving consideration to the provisions of S. 7 that seem
to require or justify discussion here, it may be well, since this is
the bill sponsored'by the American Bar Association, briefly to review the Association's activities which have culminated in the
recommendation of this bill. They are thus summarized in the
Supplemental Report of the Special Committee on Administrative
Law submitted to the House of Delegates on February 28, 1944:1°
"In recent years the first substantial recommendation of the Special Committee on Administrative Law was the presentation of a
measure for the establishment of a federal administrative court
(see S. 1835, 73d Cong. 1st Sess.; S. 3676, 75th Cong. 3d Sess.;
58 A.B.A. Rep. 203, 426 (1933); 59 A.B.A. Rep. 539 (1934);
60 A.B.A. Rep. 136 (1935); 61 A.B.A. Rep. 220, 233, 721
(1936)). That was succeeded by the legislature proposal known
generally as the Walter-Logan Bill, which was sponsored by the
Association, passed by Congress, and vetoed by the President
(62 A.B..A. Rep. 262, 790 (1937); 62 A.B.A. Rep. 156, 333
(1937) ; 63 A.B.A. Rep. 281 (1938) ; 65 A.B.A. Rep. 215 (1940) ;
H.R. 6324, 76th Cong. 3d Sess.; House Dec. No. 986, 76th Cong.
3d Sess.; 66 A.B.A. Rep. 143-144 (1942)). Shortly thereafter
the so-called Attorney General's Committee on Administrative
Procedure made its final report, including legislative recommendations by both a majority and a minority of that committee (Sen.
Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong. 1st Sess., 1941). The American Bar As' (1943) 68 A. B. A. Rep. 254.
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sociation did not adopt either of those measures as its choice, nor
did it continue its backing of the Walter-Logan bill; instead, it
adopted a declaration of principles which it felt should be included
in any adequate federal legislation and declared that, of the existing proposals, that of the minority of the Attorney General's Committee more nearly met the principles so declared. Thereafter a
subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee held extensive
hearings on the proposals growing out of the report of the Attorney General's Committee (Hearings, Administrative Procedure,
on S. 674, S. 675, and S. 918, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., three parts
plus appendix), but suspended consideration in the summer of
1941 because of the imminence of war and the then declared national emergency. Accordingly, for the last year and a half the
Special Committee on Administrative Law of the American Bar
Association has devoted its energies to the development of the
Conference on Administrative Law and other matters covered in
its annual reports (67 A.B.A. Rep. 226 (1942))."
On the date stated, February 28, 1944, the House of Delegates
unanimously approved the proposed bill submitted by the Committee, which bill contained provisions, so far as the question of
judicial review is concerned, substantially the same as those included in S. 7.1G
The content of the McCarran-Sumners bill seems in part to
stem from the work of the Special Committee on Administrative
Law of the Bar Association,1 7 and in part from the so-called
1',The following resolution, however, was adopted by the House of Delegatcs:
"RESOLVED, That while the House of Delegates heartily supports
the proposed Administrative Procedure Act as submitted by the Committee
on Administrative Law and strongly urges its enactment by the Congress
at the earliest practicable time in order to accomplish without delay the
many substantial improvements which such a law would bring about, the
Association at the same time adheres to and reaffirms its historic position in
favor of a broad and adequate judicial review for the protection of the
rights of persons and property when affected by quasi-judicial determinations
made by fact-finding agencies; and the House of Delegates authorizes and
directs that the Committee on Administrative Law, along' with its support
of the bill now submitted, shall continue its studies and efforts to secure the
enactment of other and additional measures for remedying administrative
abuses, and particularly to formulate and support a suitable provision which,
in addition to the grounds of judicial review provided for in the present bill,
will assure a broader and more adequate judicial review.
"FURTHER RESOLVED, That the Committee on Administrative
Law shall from time to time report to the House of Delegates or the Board
of Governors its further recommendations to carry out the above-stated purposes of this resolution." (1944) 30 A. B. A. J., pp. 181, 182.
"Thus in its 1939 report the Committee favored the substantial evidence
rule, but, in what was perhaps an attempt to avoid the possibility that a slight
amount of evidence might be held sufficient without consideration of the
whole record, suggested that the rule ought to be that findings "unsupported
by substantial evidence or clearly erroneous" should be reversed. The words
"or clearly erroneous" were taken from the Rules of Civil Procedure of the

168
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"minority report"'18 of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure referred to above. This latter committee
was appointed by Attorney General Murphy in February of 1939
at the request of President Roosevelt and made its final report on
January 22, 1941, This report (474 printed pages) has been published as Senate Document No. 8, 77th Congress, First Session.
The Committee, as constituted when the report was made, comprised Dean Acheson, now Assistant Secretary of State. Francis

Biddle, now Attorney General, Ralph E. Fuchs, Professor of Law,
Washington University Law School, Lloyd K. Garrison, Dean of
the University of Wisconsin Law School, D. Lawrence Groner,
Chief Justice, Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
Henry M. Hart, Jr., Professor of Law, Harvard Law School,
Carl McFarland, Washington lawyer and former Assistant Attorney General, James W. Morris, Judge of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Harry Schulman, Profes-

sor of Law, Yale University School of Law, E. Blythe Stason,
Dean of the University of Michigan Law School, and Arthur T.
Vanderbilt, New Jersey lawyer, former President of the American Bar Association.
The majority of the Attorney General's Committee made a
number of recommendations and submitted a bill to carry out
these recommendations. The majority did not, however, include
any recommendation for statutory changes in the scope of judicial
review, its conclusion being :"0
"Dissatisfaction with the existing standards as to the scope
of judicial review derives largely from dissatisfaction with the
fact-finding procedures now employed by the administrative bodies.
'The need for review of questions of fact is less if the machinery
Federal Courts, Sec. 52(a), where they are used with referenc to the scope
of review in cases tried without a jury. It seems, however, that the words
"clearly erroneous" probably provide a broader scope of review than that
permitted under the substantial evidence rule. See District of Columbia v.
Pace, (1944) 320 U. S. 698. And it is doubtless for this reason that they
were omitted from the "minority" recommendations of the Attorney General's Committee and from the bill now being sponsored by the Bar Association.
'sThere are discussions of the report, (1941) in 27 A. B. A. J. 91 ff.,
(1941) 27 A. B. A. J. 140 ff. and (1941) 27 A. B. A. J. 207.
'-Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies, Senate Document
No. 8, 77th Congress, First Session, p. 92. The "majority report" was submitted by Messrs. Acheson, Biddle, Fuchs, Garrison, Hart, Morris and
Schulman; the "minority report" contained the additional views, rccommendations and bill offered by Messrs. McFarland, Stason and Vanderbilt,
with Chief Justice Groner concurring but going further as to separation of
functions. The "minority report" was not so much a dissent as the submission of additional views. Since the two reports are commonly referred to as
the "majority" and "minority" that terminology will be used here.
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for the determination of facts inspires confidence; it is greater if
it does not.' Quite apart from the objections to the suggested
changes stated above, the Committee believes that the machinery
which it has recommended in this report for administrative adjudications will inspire confidence and will obviate the reasons
for change in the scope of judicial review.
"What has been said about the sufficiency of the existing provisions for judicial review applies only, of course, so long as the
courts continue to discharge conscientiously the functions of review stated above. These require that, under whatever formula,
the court should review the proceeding sufficiently to be satisfied
that the administration is not arbitrary and is within permissive
bounds of administrative discretion. Between the limits of maximum and minimum review derived from the Constitution, the
Congress has power to regulate the extent of the courts' participation. When and if the Congress is dissatisfied with the existing
review of particular types of administrative determinations, it then
may and should, by specific and purposive legislation, provide for
such change as it desires. Only by addressing itself to particular
situations, and not by general legislation for all agencies and all
types of determinations alike, can Congress make effective and
desirable change."
There is much to be said for the point of view thus expressed in the "majority" report of the Committee. It is believed,
however, that there is more to be said for the "minority" viewpoint which in substance has become incorporated into the provisions of the McCarran-Sunmers bill above quoted. The position of
the "minority" is thus stated in its report:
"(1) Certainly the haphazard, uncertain, and variable results
of the present system or lack of system of judicial review constitute a major 'deficiency.' As is well stated in Chapter VI of the
Committee report, the general statutory phrases now in use, purporting to express the congressional intent as to the scope of judicial review of administrative determinations of facts, are freely
interpreted by the courts. Wide variations in results in specific
cases defy explanation. Furthermore, a fundamental change is
taking place in the concepts of the scope of judicial review hitherto
derived from the implications of due process, separation of powers,
and the nature of judicial power under Article III of the Constitution, so that the question is likely to loom even larger in the
future than it has in the past. The opinion of the majority of the
Supreme Court handed down last June in Railroad Commission of
Texras z'. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U. S. 573, and touched
upon in chapter VI of the Committee report, forces us to the conclusion that, in the future, fact issues involving due process, equal
protection, and doubtless also other constitutional guarantees will in
all probability no longer be subject to court review as a matter of
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constitutional right. Since cases involving these issues generally
deal with important interests and often raise questions of high
emotional or political content, it follows that the present state of
uncertainty constitutes an even greater defect than heretofore,
and the importance of proper attention to judicial review of fact
determinations is very great.
"(2) The present scope of judicial review is also subject to
question in view of one of the prevalent interpretations of the
'substantial evidence' rule set forth as a measure of judicial review
in many important statutes. Under this interpretation, if what is
called 'substantial evidence' is found anywhere in the record to
support conclusions of fact, the courts are said to be obliged to
sustain the decision without reference to how heavily the countervailing evidence iay preponderate-unless indeed the stage of
arbitrary decision is reached. Under this interpretation, the courts
need to read only one side of the case and, if they find any evidence there, the administrative action is to be sustained and the
record to the contrary is to be ignored. The courts, of course.
should not weigh meticulously every bit of evidence. Indeed, such
a requirement would prove a very undesirable burden. But the
courts should set aside decisions clearly contrary to the manifest
weight of the evidence. Otherwise, important litigated issues of
fact are in effect conclusively determined in administrative decisions based upon palpable error.
"(3) The present statutory formulas of judicial review fail to
take account of differenceg between the various types of fact determinations, not only as between agencies but also within a
single agency. Some fact determinations involve highly technical
matters and require special experience and training; others involve technology in small degree or not at all. Some impinge
heavily upon private rights; others do so lightly, if at all. Some
are intended to be merely preliminary to the exercise of validly
conferred administrative discretion; others involve no discretionary element but are quite objective. Some are rendered by longestablished, well-tried tribunals in whom all persons have confidence; some come from new and hurriedly organized agencies.
Yet, for the most part all these different types of fact determinations are cast into a single mold, with a single general formula for
judicial review. The lack of a reasoned approach to the problem
is obvious. It is small wonder that the courts sometimes feel entitled and, indeed, obliged to indulge in free interpretation of the
statutory language of review.
"(4) The present standards of judicial review are unsatisfactory because of the very manner of their establishment. The
scope of review is, in effect, determined by the usual case-to-case
procedure of the courts. This results in a microscopic view of the
field as each point is determined in the line of demarcation. The
process is unfair to litigants and burdensome to the courts. We
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think it would be a major improvement if the several types of
issues decided by each administrative agency were enumerated and
precise and definite language were adopted to indicate the intended scope of review of each type. This, if it is to be done
at all, must be done by Congress itself. The present piece-work
process is not likely to produce anything more satisfactory than a
patchwork result.
"In view of existing deficiencies, we think it not sufficient to
await and rely solely upon the benefits of a reorganization of subordinate administrative hearing officers and their procedure as
recommended by the Committee, although such reorganization, if
adequately directed by statute and faithfully carried out, will be
productive of much good. It is unsatisfactory to the citizen and
unfair to the courts to provide for judicial review without defining its scope. In effect the courts are asked to choose between
themselves and other public agencies,. they are asked to assume
or deny themselves power of review, and they are made a party
to the result of conflicting statutory interpretations. Under these
circumstances, it is natural that the courts should lean backwards
to deny themselves powers which Congress has not clearly conferred upon them.""'
The reference to the decision in the Rowan & Nichols Case in
the language quoted has to do with the much discussed questions
of constitutional fact and jurisdictional fact. If, as many lawyers
think,'- the decision in the Rowan & Nichols Case presages the
end of the rule in the Ohio Valley Case- and perhaps that in
the equally noted case of Crowell v. Benson,2 3 and the Supreme
Court finally so holds, the importance of the scope of judicial review of the facts will indeed be greater.
The comment of the "minority" on the possibility that the
courts might hold the "substantial evidence" rule required them
"to read only one side of the case and, if they find any evidence
there, the administrative action is to be sustained and the record
-"Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies, Senate Document
No. 8, 77th Congress, Ist Session, pp. 210, 212.
!"See Dickinson, Judicial Review of Administrative Determinations, 25
'MINX'ESoTA LAw REVIEW 588, 595 ff.
Curtis, Judicial Review of Commission-the Ohio Valley Case, (1921) 34 Harvard Law Review 862. Judicial
Review of Administrative Findings-Crowell v. Benson, (1932) 41 Yale L. J.
1037. Conclusiveness of Administratiye Finding of Jurisdictional Fact,
(1940) 24 MINESOTA LAW REviEw 854. Larson, Doctrine of Constitutional
Fact, (1941) 15 Temp. L. Q. 185. See also the testimony of Dean Stason in
the record of hearings on Administrative Procedure before the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1941. 77th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 1352. 1353;
see also Landis-The Administrative Process, pp. 140 ff.
-'Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon, (1920)

253 U. S. 287, 40 S. Ct.

527, 64 L. Ed. 908.
".2
(1932) 285 U. S. 222, 52 S. Ct. 285, 76 L. Ed. 598.
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to the contrary is to be ignored" is based on certain language of
2
the Supreme Court in several comparatively recent cases. While
it is believed that the weight of judicial opinion is such that this
fear is hardly justified 2 5 certainly there can be no objection to
clarifying whatever doubt there may be on this phase of the
,matter.
The bill recommended in the "minority" report contains the
following language on the scope of judicial review :.2G
"311 . . . (e) Scope of review.-As to the findings, conclusions, and decisions in any case, the reviewing court, regardless
of the form of the review proceeding, shall consider and decide
so far as necessary to its decision and where raised by the parties,
all relevant questions of: ((1) constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (2) the statutory authority or jurisdiction of
the agency; (3) the lawfulness and adequacy of procedure: (4)
findings, inferences, or conclusions of fact unsupported, upon the
whole record, by substantial evidence; and (5) administrative
action otherwise arbitrary or capricious. Provided, how'cZ'er, that
upon such review due weight shall be accorded the experience,
technical competence, specialized knowledge, and legislative policy
of the agency involved as well as the discretionary authority conferred upon it."
The bills proposed in the "majority" and "minority" reports
of the Attorney General's Committee became, respectively, S. 675
and S. 674 as introduced in the 77th Congress. It was on these two
bills (and one other) that the hearings above referred to (p. 167,
supra.) were held by a subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary
Committee from April 2nd to July 2, 1941. At these hearings
representatives of the American Bar Association, the Federal
Administrative Commissions,and many others appeared and testified. The Government representatives, speaking broadly, favored
S. 675, and the representatives of the Bar, again speaking broadly,
favored S. 674. As above stated, the Senate Committee suspended
consideration of the matter in the summer of 1941, without action
having been taken. The Bar Association Committee, however, continued its studies and conferences and finally, on February 28,
1944, as above stated (p. 167, supra.) submitted, and the House
24See the testimony of Dean Stason in the record of the hearings on
Administrative Procedure before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 77th
Congress, 1st Session, pp. 1355, 1356.
"5See Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Boland, (N. Y. Ct. of App.) (1940) 26
N. E. (2) 247, 255; Galloway v. United States, (1943) 319 U. S. 372, 396,
63 S.Ct. 1077, 87 L. Ed. 1458.
2oAdministrative Procedure in Government Agencies, Senate Document
No. 8, 77th Congress, 1st Session, (1941) pp. 246, 247.

REI'IEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS

Delegates approved, a bill which contained provisions for judicial review substantially like those in S. 7.27
To date no hearings have been held by either Judiciary Committee on S. 7 but there is at least a possibility that such hearings
may be held shortly. It is apparent that this bill has strong Congressional sponsorship and that it will be supported by the American Bar Association.-I
The major controversy as to judicial review provisions like
those in S. 7 has been on the measure of review of the Commissions' findings of facts. The increasing importance-or what may
be the increasing importance if certain seeming judicial trends
continue-of findings of fact by administrative agencies has al-

uf

7

The relevant provisions of the Committee's proposed bill were:
"Sec. 9 . .. (f) Scope of Reziew.-With reference to any action or the
application, threatened application or terms of any rule or order and notwithstanding the form of the proceeding or whether brought by private
parties for review or by public officers or others for enforcement, the reviewing court shall consider and decide, so far as necessary to its decision
and where raised by the parties, all relevant questions of law arising upon
the whole record or such parts thereof as may be cited by any of the parties;
and, upon such review, such court shall hold unlawful such act or set aside
such application, rule, order, or any administrative finding or conclusion
made, sanction or requirement imposed, or permission or benefit withheld
to, the extent that it finds them (1) arbitrary or capricious; (2) contrary to
constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (3) in excess of statutory authority, jurisdiction, or limitations or short of statutory right, grant,
privilege, or benefit; (4) made or issued without due observance of all procedures required by law; or (5) either a-unsupported by substantial evidence upon the whole record in any case in which the action, rule, or order
is required by statute to be taken, made or issued after administrative hearing or b unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts in any case,
including all administrative adjudications not required by statute to be made
upon administrative hearing, are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing
court." (1944) 30 A. B. A. J. 46.
"'At the House of Delegates' meeting last September, Chairman Smith
of the Association's Committee said, as to the predecessor to S. 7 in the
last Congress:
"... the tremendous support which our bill has received is most encouraging. I thank the members of the House of Delegates, and those members of the Association, who have advised the Committee as to what they
have done, in order to obtain support for the bill from their representatives
in the Congress.
"We have found that other organizations-labor, agricultural organiza-'
tions, business organizations-are interested in this measure; and we expect
to find them supporting our proposal. The time has now come to see whether
we have the leadership, and can create the public opinion, not on a partisan
but on a non-partisan basis, in favor of this bill to improve the administration
of justice by providing a fair administrative procedure. We shall need your
2

continued cooperation.
"We shall need, in addition to that, your aid in explaining to laymen in

different walks of life the advantages of this bill to them, the importance of
its enactment. We need your cooperation in urging your representatives in
Cingress to support this bill, in either the Senate or the House." (1944)
311A. B. A. J. 646.

174 ,

4MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

ready been commented on (p. 171, supra). But, aside from this,
any one familiar with the administrative process knows the crucial
importance of the fact-finding part of that process. As Chief
Justice Hughes once said :9
"The power of administrative bodies to make findings of fact
which may be treated as conclusive, if there is evidence both ways,
is a power of enormous consequence. An unscrupulous administrator might be tempted to say 'Let me find the facts for the people
of my country, and I care little who lays down the general principles.'
On this question of the extent of review by the courts of the
findings of fact of administrative agencies, S. 7 adopts (in subdivision (5)) the so-called "substantial evidence" rule," a rule
that has much both legislative and judicial background. As to the
former, Dean Stason's testimony, before the Senate Committee in
1941 will suffice :"'
"Now, that term 'substantial evidence' has had a considerable
history in American statute law, and it is of very great importance
today in administartive proceedings. It first appeared in the Trade
Commission Act in 1914 in a somewhat different form. In the
same year it was written into the Clayton Act. Since that time it
has been embodied in some 17 other Federal statutes.
"These 19 statutes now provide that the decisions of the administrative agencies shall b conclusive 'if supported by substantial evidence.' The statutes are: The Tariff Commission Act,
the Federal Communications Act, the Federal Power Commission
Act, Securities and Exchange Act, Public Utility Holding Company Act, the Alcohol Administration legislation, the Toll Bridge
Act, Social Security Act, National Labor Relations Act, Bituminous Coal Act, Fair Labor Stnadards Act, the Agricultural
Adjustment Act, the Natural Gas Act, the Food and Drug Act.
Civil Aeronautics Authority, and finally in 1940, the 'substantial
evidence' rule was written in the Bridge Alteration Act.
"In all of these exceedingly important statutory structures,
then, the decisions of the administrative tribunals charged with
enforcement are accorded conclusiveness on the facts if their decisions are supported by substantial evidence."
Prior to 1941 and since, however, the "substantial evidence"
rule has been applied and has evolved in the decisions of the courts
as well. Thus as long ago as 1906 in Jenkins & Reynolds Co. v.
29As reported in U. S. Daily November 1, 1930.
30A very comprehensive and well-done article on the development and
meaning of the "substantial evidence" rule by Dean Stason is: Substantial
Evidence in Administrative Law, (1941) 89 U. of Pa. Law Review 1026.
-"Record of Hearings on Administrative Procedure before the Senate
Judiciary Committee, 77th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 1354, 1355.
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.tlpcna Portland Cement Co..3 2 the Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth
Circuit, in a directed verdict case, said:
"The motion should be sustained unless among such evidence as
has been introduced there is evidence favoring such of the ultimate
or constitutive facts of plaintiff's case as have been put in issue
to a substantial degree. By substantial evidence is not meant that
which goes beyond a mere scintilla of evidence. Evidence may go
beyond a mere scintilla, and yet not be substantial.
"What constitutes such evidence may be indicated in another
way. If the evidence favoring such facts of the plaintiff's case is
such that reasonable men may fairly differ as to whether it establishes them, then it is substantial. If, however, it is such that all
reasonable men must conclude that it does not establish them, then
it is not substantial."
In his testimony before the Senate Committee in 1941, Dean
Stason thus summarizes the decisions of the courts as to what constitutes substantial evidence :3
-* * * the term 'substantial evidence' has sometimes been
equated to the term 'arbitrary and capricious action' in such a
manner as to permit setting aside decisions but only if found to be
arbitrary. This view is rather frequently held by the courts, but it
seems to me to be unwisely restrictive. Arbitrary action, as we
normally think of it, involves some active error, and such interpretation simply spells a scope of review that would fail to reach
many gross errors which should not be permitted to stand.
"On the other hand, the term 'substantial evidence' is sometimes construed to require virtually a weighing of the testimony,
a balancing of the persuasive effect of the evidence offered on the
one side against that offered by the other. That techfiique has in the
past been followed in the review of Federal Trade Commission
cases. Whenever this interpretation is adopted, no evidence is
deemed substantial unless, upon examination of the whole record,
a substantial conviction of the 'rightness' of the decision exists in
the mind of the reviewing court.
"Such a construction is quite as objectionable as is the other
extreme. It makes the court the final arbiter on the issues of fact in
in all cases, and if it were generally adopted it would not only
everload the courts but would withdraw from the administrative
tribunals 'appointed by law and informed by experience' the
conclusiveness which common sense and good administration
demand.
"There are, however, a goodly number of intermediate positions
which have been taken by the courts between the extremes just
:'(1906) 147 Federal 641, 643.
:CRecord of Hearings on Administrative Procedure before the Senate

Judiciary Committee, 77th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 1356, 1357.
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outlined. One of the intermediate positions, and probably the most
generally accepted meaning ascribed to the term 'substantial evidence' is this: The term 'substantial evidence' is'construed to confer finality upon an administrative decision on the facts when, upon
an examination of the entire record, the evidence, including the
inferences therefrom, is found to be such that a reasonable man,
acting reasonably, might have reached the decision. On the other
hand, if a reasonable man, acting reasonably, could not have
reached the decision upon the evidence and the inferences therefrom, then the decision is not supported by substantial evidence,
and it should be set aside.
"In effect, this is the prevailing rule in jury trials relative to
the direction of verdicts, and is also the so-called mandatory rule
applied by courts in setting aside jury verdicts because contrary to
the evidence.
"So we find all of these different interpretations of substantial
evidence. The term appears in 19 statutes and is interpreted in a
wide variety of ways. It is certainly not unduly pessimistic to conclude that at the present moment judicial review, both as regards
statute law and case law, is in a state of unsatisfactory indefiniteness and uncertainty, and that there are wide divergencies that
need the attention of Congress.
"Now, the question is, 'What can and should be done about it?'
The minority group of the Attorney General's committee feels that
there are two things that can be done: The first can be done in
connection with this particular legislation now before the committee. The other is a long-time proposition that will have to be
carried out through a period of years by amendment of individual
statutes.
"Section 311 (e),'that I read at the beginning, endeavors to
attain the first- of these ends. It endeavors to clarify that 'substantial evidence' rule. It seems perfectly clear that the rule should
be clarified and given a definite content and meaning.
"As I have stated, although judicial decisions are spotted all
the way up and down the scale, many courts have taken the position that substantial evidence should be equated to the rules concerning directed verdicts. That seems to be an eminently sensible
conclusion. If it were generally accepted, if it could be made
mandatory by statute, then the courts would be obliged to survey
the entire records in cases arising under the rule and would be required to sustain administrative-fact decisions if the evidence, including the inferences therefrom, is found to be such that a reasonable man acting reasonably might have reached the decision. On
the other hand, if a reasonable man, acting reasonably, could not
have reached the decision, then the result would be otherwise and
the decision would be set aside. Thus conceived and interpreted, the
substantial evidence rule would be eminently sound as applied to
a vast majority of administrative-fact questions. It would permit
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wide latitude of administrative action, but it would at the same time
check gross and palpable errors.
"Now, section 311 (e) seeks to accomplish those ends."
Thus it seems clear that the interpretation of "substantial evidence" envisioned in S. 7 is that those words shall "be equated to the
rules concerning directed verdicts."' 4 Interestingly enough, this proposal brings into a very modern setting one of the law's most ancient
figures: the reasonable man. 33 Also it applies to the fact-finding
functions of the administrative agencies a rule and a technique that
the courts have evolved in dealing with the best known fact-finding
agency in the common law: the petit jury. Thus it uses a balancing
factor which, over the years and over the centuries, has proved
its own validity. It does indeed seem, as Dean Stason puts it, "to
be an eminently sensible conclusion."
The other provisions concerning judicial review contained in
S. 7 have not been much disputed and do not require lengthy
comment here. :;
In his written statement filed with the Senate Committee in
the 1941 hearing above referred to, Attorney General Biddle said:
"But if it is thought that some provision on judicial review is
necessary, I am inclined to agree with Senator Danaher that a revision of section 311 (e) of S. 674 which would restate the existing
:34See in this connection Labor Board v. Columbian Co., (1939) 306 U. .S
292, 300, where Chief Justice Stone, speaking for the Court, says: "Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, and must do more than create a
suspicion of the existence of the fact to be established. 'It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,' and it must be enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn from it is
one of fact for the jury."
a. See Prosser on Torts, p. 224 ff.
:"'The much quoted statement of the scope of judicial review in Interstate Commerce Commission v. Union Pacific R. R., (1912) 222 U. S. 541,
547, shows the extent to which the judicial review provisions of S. 7 stem
from the decisions of the United States Supreme Court:
"There has been no attempt to make an exhaustive statement of the
principle involved, but in cases thus far decided, it has been settled that the
orders of the Commission are final unless (1) beyond the power which
it could constitutionally exercise; or (2) beyond its statutory power; or (3)
based upon a mistake of law. But questions of fact may be involved in the
determination of questions of law, so that an order, regular on its face, may
be set aside if it appears that (4) the rate is so low as to be confiscatory
and in violation of the constitutional prohibition against taking property
without due process of law; or (5) if the Commission acted so arbitrarily
and unjustly as to fix rates contrary to evidence, or without evidence to support it; or (6) if the authority therein involved has been exercised
in such an unreasonable manner as to cause it to be within the elementary
rule that the substance, and not the shadow, determines the validity of the
exercise of the power"
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provisions for judicial review would be feasible. This could be done
as follows:
" 'Unless otherwise precluded or unless a broader scope of review is prescribed by law, as to the findings, conclusions, and
decision in any final order, the reviewing court, regardless of the
form of the review proceeding, shall consider and decide so far as
necessary to its decision and where raised by the parties all relevant questions of (1) constitutional right, power, privilege, or
immunity; (2) the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the
agency; (3) the lawfulness of procedure; and (4) finding or conclusions of fact unsupported by substantial evidence.' ,o
It should be noted that Mr. Biddle's alternative proposal does not
include the words "arbitrary or capricious," nor the words "upon
the whole record" or their equivalent, both contained in the provisions of S.7. Before the Senate Subcommittee it was contended
on behalf of the Federal Power Commission that the words
"arbitrary or capricious" appeared "to open a scope of review not
now available, the extent of which is uncertain and which might
be used to hamstring administrative agencies seeking to protect
the public."3 Also before that Committee the Civil Aeronautics
Board took the position that the words "upon the whole record"
"are designed to change substantially the present well established
court rule that if there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the agency, such findings will not be set aside." ' These
objections hardly seem tenable. A better case could be made for
Mr. Biddle's omissions on the ground that the quoted words are
redundant and therefore unnecessary, and perhaps his reason
for their exclusion in his alternative proposal was that rather than
his belief that the position of the two commissions referred to was
sound.
So much for S.7. Its provisions as to judicial review, as above
set forth in detail, are the result of many years' study by those most
competent to deal with the crucially important subject involved.
The weight of the argument, it is submitted, supports their soundness, and it is believed that the public interest will best be served
by their enactment.
The other bills pending in the Congress on federal administrative procedure require only brief mention here. H. R. 184, intro3
7Record of Hearings on Administrative Procedure before the Senate
Judiciary
Committee, 77th Congress, 1st Session, p. 1452.
38
Record of Hearings on Administrative Procedure before the Senate
Judiciary Committee, 77th Congress, 1st Session, p. 498.
39Record of Hearings on Administrative Procedure before the Senate
judiciary Committee, 77th Congress, 1st Session, p. 665.
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duced in the House on January 3, 1945, by Mr. Celler is substantially in the form of the bill recommended by the "majority" of
the Attorney General's Committee. This bill, while excellently
drawn, contains no reference to the scope of judicial review of
administrative decisions, and for the reasons above set forth it is
believed to offer a less desirable approach to the problem here
under consideration than that proposed in S. 7. H. R. 1206, introduced by Mr. Walter on January 8, 1945, is substantially like the
bill recommended by the "minority" of the Attorney General's
Committee, and H. R. 339, introduced on January 3, 1945, by Mr.
Smith, while essentially different in other respects from H. R. 1206
and S. 7 does not differ in substance so far as provisions for
judicial review are concerned, from either of those bills. Thus all
if the bills pending in the Congress which contain provisions for
judicial review adopt the "substantial evidence" rule herein discussed, and, as above pointed out, (p. 178, supra) Attorney General Biddle is of the opinion that if any provisions for judicial re40
view are to be enacted they should include that rule.
LEGISLATION

PENDING IN

THE MINNESOTA LEGISLATURE

H. F. 340, now pending in the Minnesota House of Representatives, contains the following with reference to the scope of judicial
review:
-Sec. 11. * * *
"The court shall have jurisdiction to review all conclusions of
law and such findings of fact as were the subject of a motion to
amend as provided in Section 10. The court shall have no jurisdiction to amend or modify any finding of fact which was not the
subject of such motion to amend. Any finding of fact which is not
supported by a fair preponderance of the evidence shall be modified
by the court so as to be in accord with the fair preponderance of
the evidence."
On June 21, 1941, the Minnesota Judicial Council appointed
a Special Committee on the Unification of Courts. The resolution
suggested five subjects for the consideration of the Committee, of
which one was as follows:
4"It is also of interest in this connection that the proposed Uniform Administrative Procedure Act, as approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws contains (Section 23) provisions for
judicial review, including the "substantial evidence" rule, substantially in
the same form as those contained in S. 7 and the other bills on administrative

procedure pending before the Congress and herein commented on. So far

as the writer is advised Wisconsin is the only state which to date has adopted

the Uniform Act. (See Wisconsin Laws 1943, Chapter 375.)
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"(4) The relation of the courts to decisions of administrative
commissions and similar bodies."
Later, however, this Section (4) was referred by the Judicial
Council to the State Bar Association for further study, which at
its annual meeting in 1942 authorized the appointment of a Special
Committee on Administrative Law to study this and allied questions. As a result of this Committee's consideration H. F. 891 was
introduced in the last session of the v'finnesota legislature. That bill
differed from H. F. 340 in that it omitted all reference to the scope
of judicial review-in other words, it did not contain the language
above quoted. During the last session H. F. 891 was recommended
for passage by the Judiciary Committees of both houses, but was
lost in the pressure of the last few days of the session.
A proposed bill identical, at least so far as the matter here
under consideration is concerned, with H. F. 340, was submitted
by the State Bar Association's Committee on Administrative Law
to the Association at its Duluth meeting last July and was there
approved. Very recently the Bar Association's executivres appeared
at a hearing before the House Judiciary Committee in supp rt of
H. F. 340.
The only provision in H. F. 340 which uses the words "substantial evidence" is that in Section 5, Subdivision 1, which says:
"Only substantial evidence shall be received," a usage which
obviously has no bearing on the question under discussion here."
The critical words in Sec. 11, as above quoted:
"Any finding of fact which isnot supported by a fair preponderance
of the evidence shall be modified by the court so as to be in accord
with the fair preponderance of the evidence."
are intended, it would seem clear, to prescribe a scope of review
broader than the "substantial evidence" rule above discussed in
detail.
In this connection it should be pointed out that the Minnesota
decisions have laid down the "substantial evidence" rule. Thus in
State v. Great Northern Ry. Co.4 2 the Court said:

"The court does not consider the wisdom or expediency of the
order. The court ascribes to the findings of the commission 'the
strength due to the judgments of a tribunal appointed by law and
41To the writer the use in this connection of the words "substantial
evidence" is unclear. Perhaps those words were used in the sense of "relevant evidence." In any event this phase of the pending bill is not here involved.
42(1916) 135 Minn. 19, 159 N. W. 1089.
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informed by experience,' and its conclusion, when supported by
substantial evidence, is accepted as final." (p. 22)43
In Steenerson v. Great Northern Railway Co.4 4 the Court had

under consideration the following statute:
"'Upon such appeal, and upon the hearing of any application
* * * for the enforcement of any such order made by the commission, the district court shall have jurisdiction to, and it shall,
examine the whole matter in controversy, including matters of fact
as well as questions of law, and to affirm, modify or reserve such
order in whole or in part, as justice may require; and in case of
any order being modified, as aforesaid, such modified order shall,
for all the purposes contemplated by this act, stand in place of the
original order so modified and have the same force and effect
throughout the state as the orders of said commission.' " (p. 375)
As to this statute the Court said:
"If by this the legislature intended to provide that the court
should put itself in the place of the commission, try the matter de
novo, and determine what are reasonable rates, without regard
to the findings of the commission, such intent cannot be carried out,
as a statute which so provided would be unconstitutional. The
fixing of rates is a legislative or administrative act, not a judicial
one. *
And the performance of such duties cannot, under
our constitution, be imposed on the judiciary. * * *
"But it is not necessary to construe this statute so as to render
it unconstitutional. It does not by express words, or even by necessary implication, provide that the court shall stand in the shoes of
the commission, and try the matter de novo. Under the constitution,
the district court may, on appeal to it, review the findings of the
commission in the same manner as an appellate court reviews the
findings of the jury on a trial in the court below. And for this
purpose the court may 'examine the whole matter in controversy,
including matters of fact, as well as questions of law.'
"In other words, the court may examine matters of fact to
ascertain whether there is any evidence reasonably tending to
support the findings of fact disputed, and may examine questions
of law arising on the facts conceded. It seems to us that this is, then,
the proper interpretation of this somewhat vague and obscure
statute, and the only interpretation which will render it constitu'
tional." (pp. 375, 376) 15
It is not within the purview of this article to express an opinion
as to whether the provisions of H. F. 340 requiring the Courts to
modify the findings of administrative agencies "so as to be in
4 See also Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co. v. Verschingel, (1936) 197
Minn. 580, 585, 268 N. W. 2.
.14(1897)
69 Minn. 353, 72 N. W. 713.
5

4 See also State v. Great Northern Ry. Co., (1915) 130 Minn. 57, 59,
153 N. W. 247; also the South Dakota case of (1942) Application of Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 6 N. W. (2d) 165, 170.
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accord with a fair preponderance of the evidence" in those cases
in which those findings are found not to be supported by such fair
preponderance would be held to be an attempt to impose a legislative duty on the Courts in violation of the Minnesota Constitution.
The Steenerson decision would seem, however, to make that question somewhat debatable.
The wisdom of the broader review provisions set forth in the
language of H. F. 340 is also of course debatable. Many sincere
and public spirited people, lawyers and those not lawyers, have
been seriously and greatly disturbed by certain characteristics and
tendencies that have shown themselves among modern administrative agencies. 4 6 Indeed the President's Committee on Administrative
Management in its report transmitted by the President to Congress
on January 12, 1937, said

:47

"They are in reality miniature independent governments set up
to deal with the railroad problem, the banking problem, or the
radio problem. They constitute a headless 'fourth branch' of the
Government, a haphazard deposit of irresponsible agencies and uncoordinated powers. They do violence to the basic theory of the
American Constitution that there should be three major branches
of the Government, and only three. The Congress has found no
effective way of supervising them, they cannot be controlled by the
President, and they are answerable to the courts only in respect
to the legality of their activities."
Inevitably, under the circumstances suggested in the language
of the President's Committee, the tendency of many has been to
urge a larger scope of judicial review-a tendency which doubtless explains H. F. 340 and the resolution of the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association referred to above (p. 167,
supra). But the House of Delegates approved and the American
Bar is supporting, as above pointed out, a bill which adopts the
narrower "substantial evidence" rule, and the chairmen of the
judicial committee of both Houses, themselves distinguished
lawyers, have offered that bill in the Congress.
Perhaps the recent experience of New York may be helpful
in this connection. In 1938 the people of New York voted on a
4rSee in this connection Dean Pound's address before the American Bar
Association on September 29, 1941 (1941, 27 A. B. A. J. 664).
47Language which Dean Landis finds highly objectionable (The Administrative Process: p. 4), but which the President seemed to approve, as
the following from his message transmitting the report of the Committee to
Congress indicates:
"I have examined this report carefully and thoughtfully and am convinced that it is a great document of permanent importance. The practice
of creating independent regulatory commissions, who perform administrative
work in addition to judicial work, threatens to develop into a 'fourth branch'
of the Government for which there is no sanction in the Constitution."
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proposed constitutional provision to the effect that if the Court
should find a decision of an administrative agency "to be contrary
to the evidence, or not supported by the facts" it might "direct a
reconsideration or a new hearing of the matter." At the election
there was a wide division among New York lawyers, as well as
others, on the wisdom of the broader scope of judicial review provided for and the measure was defeated at the polls. During the
discussions on this measure Governor Lehman appointed Robert
M. Benjamin to make a detailed study of the methods of administrative adjudication. Mr. Benjamin's report, a 370-page document
published in March, 1942, concluded as follows :4
"No form of judicial review, however broad in scope, could
ascertain with certainty whether a quasi-judicial determination has
been arrived at-as it should have been-on the administrative
tribunal's own considered judgment as to the preponderance of the
evidence. Adherence by the administrative tribunal to that standard
of responsible adjudication must necessarily be left to the good
faith of the tribunal. The substantial evidence rule, providing as it
does for a review of the rationality of a quasi-judicial determination on all the evidence that was before the administrative tribunal,
isbroad enough, and is capable of sufficient flexibility in its application, to enable the reviewing court to correct whatever ascertainable abuses may arise in administrative adjudication. Judicial
review broader in scope than the substantial evidence rule would,
on the other hand, permit the reviewing court to substitute its own
judgment on the evidence for that of the administrative tribunal,
and thus to supersede a quasi-judicial determination even where
that determination did represent the considered judgment of the
administrative tribunal on the evidence."
Mr. Benjamin's conclusion and summary just quoted states the
matter as well as it can be put. Debatable as the point is-and
critical as is the issue which it concerns-the "substantial evidence"
rule seems the best solution that has been devised and, as I have
attempted to point out above, it uses techniques which themselves
have been evolved in the law under somewhat analogous circumstances. It would seem, therefore, that the quoted provisions of
H. F. 340 are too broad and should not be passed without substantial change.' "
" Administrative Adjudication in the State of New York, Report by
Robert M. Benjamin as Commissioner under Section 8 of the Executive
Law (published by the State of New York, March, 1942), page 336.
'Also it would seem debatable whether our courts should be required to
carry the burden of the additional work the proposed rule would put on them;
whether the delay such a rule would cause in final administrative adjudications would not be unfortunate; and whether it would nof contribute to an
undesirable lessening of the administrative officers' own sense of responsibility.
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CONCLUSION

Perhaps an article of this type requires no conclusion. But the
heading offers an excuse for bringing in some brief comment on
several matters connected with administrative procedure not
strictly relevant here but still of very great importance in one's
understanding of the administrative process.
Joseph B. Eastman, probably the ablest of modern administrative commissioners in this country, in what proved to be his last
public address, said

:50

"the personnel which does the administering is more important
than the wording of the statute. Good men can produce better results with a poor law than poor men can produce with a good law."
The same thought is vividly expressed by John Foster Dulles at
the Senate hearings in 1941 several times above referred to:
"Nobody has yet written a law which just went out and administered itself. To say that the quality of the people that administer your laws is unimportant is, to my mind, ridiculous. The heart
of the administrative problem is to get good judges, if you can
do that.
"*

* * If a part of the furor that is aroused about these bills

could be- devoted to efforts to assure good appointments, I think
that we all would be better off."'"
Perhaps the next great task for the Bar in this field, with the
cooperation of those in the government service and in the schools
of public administration, 52 might be the devising of means whereby
the personnel of administrative agencies may be improved, their
salaries made commensurate with their responsibilities, and their
tenure of office made as nearly free from partisanship as possible
in our form of government. Here is indeed an opportunity, in the
language of Mr. Justice Stone (p. 163, supra) "come to our profession to carry forward a creative work which would enable the
law to satisfy the pressing needs of a changing order without the
loss of essential values."
Nor are administrative agencies the product of this administration or that, to be condemned in wholesale fashion or lauded
extravagantly depending on what one's attitude is toward a particular administration. Rather they are part of an evolution in
government as inevitable, under modern conditions, as that which
5
OThe 12 points in 1%r. Eastman's "credo" in the address referred to,
February 17, 1944, are printed in (1944) 30 A. B. A. J. 266.
delivered
5
"Record of Hearings on Administrative Procedure before the Senate
Judiciary Committee, 77th Congress, First Session, p. 1155.
52An outstanding example of which is the Littauer School of Harvard
University.
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once led to the establishment of courts of equity in addition to
those of law. Finally, they are in large part but the American
counterpart of what happened in England some years back. In the
language of Mr. justice Frankfurter :
"That happened in England about d generation ahead of our
time. It is not accidental. It pertains to the differences in social and
economic factors in this country compared with the English situation. England established a Railway and Canal Commission in 1854,
and the Interstate Commerce Commission was not established until
1887. You could duplicate almost every branch of social or economic
legislation in this country, and you will find England had the
counterpart anywhere from 15 to 30 years-before we did. The
Railway and Canal Act of 1854, the first important taxation of
inheritances, the Harcourt Budget of 189-1--again just about that
difference-The Workmen's Compensation Act, Unemployment
Insurance, Old Age Pensions, every one of these activities of political society with which we are still worrying in this country, had
its English counterpart anywhere from 15 to 30 years ago. These
political and legal mumps that we are passing through, England
had passed through some 20 or 30 years ago."
"Political and legal mumps" does seem to describe the situation
in more ways than one. But, if the thesis of this article is sound,
we are on the mend. It is believed, however', that the enactment of
some such bill as S. 7 will speed the mending process, and make
more pleasant and profitable the convalescence!
',In his Summation of the Cincinnati Conference on Functions and
Procedure of Administrative Tribunals in (1938) 24 A. B. A. J. 282, 283.

